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Linguistic Justice and Analytic Philosophy
Francesco Chiesa and Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
Abstract: This paper investigates whether analytic philosophers who are non-native English
speakers are subject to linguistic injustice and, if yes, what kind of injustice that is and
whether it is different from the general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet
in a world where English is rapidly becoming the lingua franca. The paper begins with a
critical review of the debate on linguistic justice, with a particular focus on the emergence of
a lingua franca and the related questions of justice, both in terms of the disadvantages
suffered by those groups who bear the cost of learning another language and in terms of
forms of discrimination due to accents and language improprieties. We argue that being at a
relative disadvantage compared to others does not necessarily translate in a proper injustice
if fundamental civil, political and social provisions are in place. We suggest that a
circumstance of injustice arises when such disadvantage affects those who are not yet
members of such academic community such as prospective students, thus contributing in
keeping the non-native group a minority. We qualify this case of disadvantage as a matter of
structural injustice.
This paper raises the two following questions: (1) Are analytic philosophers
who are non-native English speakers subject to linguistic injustice? (2) If yes,
what kind of injustice that is and is it different from the general disadvantage
that non-native English speakers meet in a world where English is rapidly
becoming the lingua franca?
In order to answer the two questions, a preliminary understanding of
what is meant by linguistic justice is in order. In the first section of this
paper, we shall review the debate on linguistic justice critically. Considering
languages both as collective goods and as individual assets, injustice may lurk
both in the process of collective good production, and in the disadvantage,
in terms of opportunity and in terms of identity, suffered by individuals as
members of a linguistic minority.
In the second section, we shall focus on the emergence of a global lingua
franca and the related questions of justice. First the emergence of a dominant
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language in a territory or in a specific area of interaction will be explained in
terms of a coordination equilibrium, where the common interest for com-
munication is served by unequal costs of members of the community. This
consideration may impact on the disadvantages suffered by those groups
who bear the cost of learning another language. Whether or not such disad-
vantage canbe considered injusticedepends onwhich conception of justice is
picked. Subscribing to a conception of justice as fairness, communicative dis-
advantages can be consideredmatters of justice. Yet, when a lingua franca pre-
vails in a specific area, speakers of minority languages suffer other kinds of
disadvantages too, for they may become subject to forms of discrimination
due to their strange accents and language improprieties. Such discrimination
may not only be explicit and direct, but also grounded on implicit biases. As a
result, non-native speakers are burdened not only with the cost of learning
another language, but also with negative attitudes of disrespect for their
imperfect mastering of the dominant language.
In the third section, the analysis of linguistic injustice previously devel-
oped will apply to the area of analytic philosophy. Within this area, the
non-native speakers of English are uncontroversially at a disadvantage, yet
in a way similar to all other areas of social, political and economic inter-
action. The point under discussion is rather whether analytic philosophy
constitutes a domain of a specific and thematic injustice for non-native
English speakers. We do not investigate the empirical dimension of the
phenomenon; we rather ask whether there are reasons why analytic philos-
ophy is different from other comparable academic areas and such that it
induces a specific kind of injustice in the case of non-native English speak-
ers. Standardly, we think of justice as what we owe to each other and of injus-
tice as the failure to give others their due. More precisely, we think of justice
as characterizing the coercively regulated relations between the holders of
certain rights and the bearers of the corresponding duties so that injustice
implies that someone is not given what she is entitled to claim against
others. So, within this justice framework, the question would be: what citi-
zens’ rights exactly are violated by the kind of linguistic disadvantage that
comes with being a non-native English speaker in analytic philosophy?
2 Francesco Chiesa and Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
The issue will be faced both from the viewpoint of the disadvantage of
becoming fluent in another language and of being subject of (direct or
implicit) discrimination due to an imperfect use of English and of
accents. The argument will conclude that, generally speaking, we do not
have reasons to think that analytic philosophy is different from other aca-
demic disciplines insofar as scholars have to become fluent in the lingua
franca. We shall argue that being at a relative disadvantage compared to
some others does not necessarily entail having been wronged in a way that
is relevant to justice and in a way that, thus, requires the implementation
of enforceable institutional remedial measures. Yet, within philosophy,
non-native English speaking analytic philosophers are slightly more disad-
vantaged compared with non-native English speaking continental philoso-
phers, since the former constitute a minority and may suffer from prestige
bias besides linguistic bias. In particular, we shall argue that such unfavor-
able biases may discourage young people to access this discipline, contribut-
ing in keeping the non-native group a minority. We shall conclude that this
specific case can be characterized as a matter of structural injustice. Such
injustice is structural because it is not easily directly attributable to specific
individuals but to structural political, social and ideological conditions.
There is no simple breach of perfect obligations but the disadvantage is
rooted in more systematic (structural) reasons. We do not envisage direct
actions of remedial justice, yet we believe that acknowledging the problem
may contribute to its solution in perspective, and we also propose some
minor adjustments in research policy at the European or national level
which may help to reduce the gap between native and non-native speakers
in the analytic philosophy community.
1. Linguistic Rights and Linguistic Justice
The research on language policy has expanded to normative issues in the
last two decades. The normative turn on language studies is related to
three different phenomena: (a) the unprecedented immigration waves
across countries from East to West, and from South to North, (b) the
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demands for autonomy of national minorities within democratic states, and
(c) the increasing affirmation of English as the global lingua franca (Riera
Gil 2016). The first two phenomena, namely immigration and the
demands of national minorities, have led political theorists to consider lin-
guistic differences just like other cultural differences, deserving to be pro-
tected by linguistic rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003). The expansion of
English as the global lingua franca in many economic, social and cultural
areas is instead at the origin of the reflection on linguistic justice. The two
discussions are connected and in many respects overlapping, yet their
focus is somewhat different.
The claim for linguistic rights is grounded on the crucial interest of being
able to speak and use one’s own language and on a specific fact about
language. Language is in a unique relation with the state, considering that
language cannot be politically disestablished as religion can, for example.
Consequently, state neutrality cannot be invoked as a policy with reference
to linguistic minorities, since which language or languages are officially used
in public offices, services and education cannot simply be left to individual
preferences. Once a language becomes the official language of the area,
only the linguistic majority has the crucial interest of speaking one’s own
language protected. So linguistic rights are meant to reverse the unfair asym-
metry between majority and minorities. Yet, which kind of rights are
language rights? Do they pertain to individuals or to collectives? Are they
personality rights or rather territorially located? (Léger and Lewis 2016).
The discussion on linguistic rights and on the protection of linguistic
minorities is well summarized in the recent study by Elvira Riera Gil
(2016) which provides a very useful topography of the issue, organized
along three dichotomies, namely (a) universality/particularity; (b) individ-
ual/collective; (c) communication/identity. The first dichotomy relates to
the dimension of language divided between its being a universal human
capacity and its being necessarily practiced ‘in the vernacular’. The
second concerns the fact that language is an individual skill and a means
for individual autonomy and flourishing, but it is also a public good. The
third dichotomy relates to the two functions of language: as a means of
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communication, and as a marker of identity. The communication function
stresses the instrumental value of language; by contrast, the identity function
stresses its intrinsic or constitutive value. The scholars who privilege the com-
munication function generally adopt an instrumentalist approach to
language issues focused on a cost-benefit analysis of alternative policies
(De Schutter 2008). Those who stress the identity function generally view
language as a fundamental, constitutive human interest and adopt a right-
based view on language policies (Reaume and Pinto 2012).
The three dichotomies intersect with different ontological conceptions
of spatial language distribution. Some view languages in a transparent
relation with a demos and a territory, and consequently hold a monist pos-
ition with regard to the territorial dominance of a language, emerged out
of an assimilation process driven by the interest of easing communication.
This view is represented by the Language Territoriality Principle (LTP),
namely by the principle affirming that any given territory, corresponding
to a state or to a region, must have an official language organizing the
public life and the institutions of the territory (Van Parijs 2011). The
monist position is criticized as being a reflection of an outdated Westphalian
view of the world, the one endorsed and pursued by nation-states, which is
said to be utterly out of tune with the reality of multicultural society in a glo-
balized world (De Schutter 2008). The alternative is instead the pluralist
view, according to which if there are more languages spoken in a territory,
the convergence to a single language cannot be achieved without injustice
and oppression. Henceforth, linguistic rights should be attributed to individ-
ual speakers who bring them along with them in their daily social inter-
course. The pluralist view implies the endorsement of the Linguistic
Personality Principle (LPP), respectful of the choices and preferences of
individuals (De Schutter 2008; Patten 2014; Riera Gil 2016). According to
the LPP, individuals bring along their language skills and preferences
through regions and territories, while institutions ought to be organized
on a bilingual or multilingual basis. Just in passing, the LPP principle,
which is claimed to be an alternative to the Westphalian view of the world,
is in reality strictly linked to nation-states. Only within a territorially
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defined political unit can in fact institutions be organized on a bilingual or
multilingual base, so as to let citizens free to use their favored language
wherever and yet within the borders of that state. If the objection to the ter-
ritoriality principle to be strictly dependent on a dated nation-state view of
the world holds for the personality principle as well, then the territoriality
principle has the advantage of being far more feasible and also fairer, as it
will become apparent in the next paragraph, discussing linguistic justice.
As we shall see, the discussion of linguistic justice is much more relevant
for the topic of this paper than the discussion on linguistic rights. The
expression ‘linguistic justice’ is mainly linked to the work of Philippe Van
Parijs (2003, 2011), whose primary focus is the expansion of English as
the global lingua franca and the effect that such a phenomenon has on
global justice: if the availability of a lingua franca is likely to be an advantage
for many in the long run; in the short run, the process of its affirmation
bears a clear burden for those people who are not English native speakers.
Languagematters for justice in two respects: first because sharing a language
is a public good, and the unfair distribution of its costs and benefits is a
matter of distributive injustice. Second, languages provide individuals with
opportunities in terms of social life, jobs, political participation and access
to services, but such opportunities are not equal if one does not speak the
dominant language of a certain place or of a certain professional domain.
Besides, such distributive disadvantages usually go hand in hand with
forms of misrecognition and disrespect for less than proficient speakers,
which may induce discrimination, and hence further disadvantages.
The growing affirmation of English as the global lingua franca overcomes
a complex situation of multilingual societies due either to the presence of
traditional national minorities or to a new linguistic diversity resulting
from migrations and people’s movements, or both. Van Parijs explains the
rise and rapid diffusion of English as a lingua franca in the background of
globalization, as the joint result of two micro-mechanisms, namely the prob-
ability-driven learning and the maxi-min dynamics. Briefly, the probability-
driven learning is the tendency of individuals to learn languages which
have more probability of being used. Maxi-min dynamics is instead
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people’s tendency in multilingual contexts to use the language more gener-
ally known in that context, even if it is not the language they are most profi-
cient in. These two mechanisms reinforce each other, and tend to favor one
language as the medium of communication in a multilingual context. Van
Parijs does not deny that other causes are at work in the emergence of a
lingua franca, such as colonialism, economic forces and political factors,
but such general factors operate through these micro-mechanisms. His
explanation of how a given language becomes a lingua franca shows also
that the emergence of a lingua franca corresponds to a principle of ration-
ality, and it is therefore a process to be welcomed in general. To have a
common language is indeed a public good, for it enlarges the possibility
of cooperation in a wider community. The problem, however, is that
while it is a general advantage to have a common medium of communi-
cation, (a) the costs of its production are unequally shared, (b) the oppor-
tunities linked to linguistic competence are unequally distributed, (c) the
respect between linguistically defined identities is unequal. Linguistic
justice, he says, requires fair terms of cooperation in the production of a
shared language, which is instead entirely carried by non-English speakers.
Moreover, it requires the equalization of opportunities linked to linguistic
competence while at present English speakers have an advantage concern-
ing job competition in an increasingly global market. Finally, the unfair
primacy given to lingua franca compared to national or local languages
ought to be addressed for it impacts on equal respect of all speakers.
The measures Van Parijs suggests to remedy the linguistic injustice con-
cerning the rising of lingua franca look rather meager compared to the com-
plexity of his analysis. Yet, this is mainly due to the global perspective of Van
Parijs’ study, and to the lack of an institutional structure for taxing unfair
benefits at the international level. The more English spreads, the less is
the burden to learn it and to practice it, hence reducing the unfairness in
the cooperation. Van Parijs relies on spontaneous processes more than on
active policies, partly for lack of realistic alternatives, and partly for he is con-
fident that the process is speeding up and sufficient resources to counter the
unfair burden have become available in the long run. There is, however, an
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aspect where he assumes a more proactive position, and that concerns the
third kind of injustice above mentioned, i.e. the unjust precedence of
English over national language impacting on the equal respect, or as he
says, on the parity of esteem of speakers. In order to defend the identity
dimension of language and the equality of respect which each speaker
deserves, Van Parijs supports the principle of linguistic territoriality, where
one language is the institutional language for schools, governments, services
in that state or region. The adoption of this principle is justified by: (a) the
pragmatic consideration that state and public institutions cannot be neutral
toward language and that a political decision must be made about which
language regime to adopt in public communication and education; (b)
the principled consideration that LTP is the best way to advocate the
parity of esteem between non-dominant languages and dominant languages
(or lingua franca). If a language is made to be the ‘queen of a territory’, there
is no risk that the mechanisms of probability driven learning and maxi-min
dynamics will take over the local language, while the risk is present if the per-
sonality principle is instead adopted. We must stress that the defense of
national or local languages, by the LTP, is meant as a defense of the
rights of individual speakers, rather than of the collective right of each
language and community to have a fair chance of survival. As mentioned
above, the territoriality principle is amply criticized by the supporters of
the alternative personality principle (De Shutter 2008; Patten 2014; De
Shutter and Robichaud 2015; Carey 2016). The main criticism of the LTP
is based on the consideration that no language convergence in a territory
obtains without oppression and dominance. Van Parijs, however, has
explained that the convergence can be spontaneously produced through
two mechanisms operating at the individual level. In a bilingual society,
these two mechanisms will tend to promote the language of the majority,
thus pushing the minority language out of use after a certain period of
time. This hypothesis seems to find confirmation in a work studying
language regimes by a game-theoretical approach (Laitin 1993), whose
analysis shows that the language survival, against socio-economic odds,
depends on specific efforts sustained by coercive means. In conclusion,
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that the territoriality principle is the best defense of a language against the
two spontaneous mechanisms which will be operative in a linguistic regime
ruled by the personality principle seems to be the stronger argument here.
Yet, such principle, aiming at parity of esteem among speakers of different
languages, in a way counteracts the spreading of the lingua franca, contribut-
ing to the persistence of unequal opportunities in specific areas, such as aca-
demia, between native and non-native speakers of English.
To sum up: questions of justice, with reference to language, lie in: (a) the
unequal costs borne by different agents in the production of the public good
of a common language; (b) the unequal opportunities of native and non-
native speakers of a lingua franca; (c) the unequal respect linked to the
imperfect and accented use of the lingua franca.
2. Lingua Franca as a Coordination Game and Biases Connected to Its
Imperfect Use
In order to understand what the injustice in the spreading of a lingua franca
is, we must firstly focus on the mechanisms at work in its production.We have
mentioned the two micro-mechanisms: the probability drive of language
learning and the maxi-min dynamics in the choice of the medium of com-
munication used among speakers of different languages. Both mechanisms
are triggered by the twin interest of maximizing one’s opportunity and of
expanding the communication in a given social domain. In a multilingual
context, these mechanisms jointly work for a spontaneous convergence on
a regional lingua franca. Following Laitin’s (1993) suggestion, the conver-
gence process may be represented as the solution of a coordination game,
where each participant would prefer to use one’s own language, but the
paramount interest in communication leads the speakers in the less
shared languages to be willing to learn another one, provided it will serve
their communication purposes. Thus, their choice will favor the relatively
most spoken language, hence enlarging the community of speakers in
that language and its strength in that area. Moreover, for any communica-
tive context, where participants have diverse linguistic skills, the most
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widely spoken language will be used, even though many or even the majority
of participants is not proficient in its usage. A coordination game is a mixed
game, for the coordination interest trumps the interest in speaking one’s
language. Even if the different participants have opposed interests for
picking language x over y, their potential conflict is overcome by the
general preference for coordination. Being a coordination game, in prin-
ciple any equilibrium of coordination will do, hence in principle any
language can be picked to become the lingua franca, but the probability
drive will orient individuals to learn the language that maximizes the prob-
ability of communication, that is the most widely spoken language in that
place and in that time. Thus the public good of having a common language,
which would in principle be satisfied by any of the languages spoken in that
area or by an artificial language, will spontaneously be produced by the joint
work of the two micro-mechanisms described above, favoring the most
widely spoken language in the area. Given, however, that individuals have
also contrasting interests concerning which language they would prefer to
have as the common language, its establishment will cost differently, and
the speakers of minority languages will bear the cost, while the speakers
of the dominant language will share the common benefit at no cost whatso-
ever. Here is precisely where the question of justice arises, but it is not
beyond controversy that the unequal cost of the public good production
is a matter of justice. The convergence on this coordination equilibrium is
in fact the spontaneous product of the free choices of individuals, and on
a libertarian interpretation, no injustice has been committed, for none of
the steps is due to any unjustified interference or coercion, and no individ-
ual right has been violated (Nozick 1974). In order to consider the disadvan-
tage of having to learn another language as unjust, one has to adopt the
principle of fairness saying that the benefits and the costs produced by
social cooperation ought to be distributed fairly among participants and
that is precisely what distributive justice consists in (Rawls 1999). In the Raw-
lsian perspective, subscribed by Van Parijs as well, the native speakers in the
lingua franca are in fact free riding on the members who supported the costs
of learning and have to use a language different from one’s own which they
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do not easily master as well as the native speakers. The possibility of a reme-
dial justice lies in making the free-riders contribute to the benefits of the
public good, through a tax which may fund the learning of the lingua
franca by non-native speakers. However, this possibility is drastically curtailed
if there is no common institutional framework capable of imposing taxes
and distributing their revenues. If, for example, the native speakers of a
lingua franca belong to different countries, it is very unlikely that any form
of remedial justice may be devised.
The injustice derived from the unfair process of production of the lingua
franca is not the only element of linguistic injustice to be remarked on.
Having some competence in the lingua francamay serve the purpose of com-
munication but it does not entail equal opportunities in the job market for
language-related and also for language-unrelated jobs. We want here to
stress the situation of the language-unrelated job market, for here is
where forms of unjustified discrimination may be found. Language-
related jobs, such as translators and interpreters, obviously require a profi-
ciency in the lingua franca, and they certainly represent an unfair advantage
for native speakers, but also a relatively circumscribed subset of the job
market. The fact is that also for non-strictly language-related jobs, profi-
ciency in the lingua franca represents a clear advantage which translates
into unequal opportunities. And the unequal opportunity of access to
language-unrelated jobs constitutes a much wider subset and thus a much
wider concern for justice.
In the market of language-unrelated jobs, not only linguistic skills in the
lingua franca matter, but also accents. There is in fact empirical research
showing the impact of non-native accents (namely non-standard Ameri-
can-English or British-English) on the ways one is treated by others. Even
if one is adequately competent in English, she may still be discriminated
against because of her accent, and here the suspicion is that accent is
more than a sign of language inadequacy, being associated to social class
or different ethnicity too. For example, a study found that individuals are
more likely to buy a product or a company when its advertising message is
read in standard American-English than when the message is delivered
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with a Mandarin Chinese or a French accent (Livingston, Schilpzand, and
Erez 2017). Other studies showed how foreign-accented speech decreases
positive affective valence of the speaker (Hatzidaki, Baus, and Costa
2015). Different levels of linguistic mastery and variation of accents can
lead to biases resulting in the speaker’s receiving more (say, Oxford
English) or less (in case of working class or foreign accent) credibility,
than she otherwise would have. This corresponds to what Miranda Fricker
(2007: 17) has called ‘credibility excess’ and ‘credibility deficit’. People
endowed with social privilege give shape to what is considered the standard
and exemplary use of language and accent. As a consequence, stereotypes,
or what Virginia Valian (1998) calls ‘schemas’ and Cecilia Ridgeway (2011)
calls ‘frames’, often unconsciously shape how people are perceived
(Hundleby 2016). We acquire and learn schemas —non conscious shared
hypothesis about different characteristics relative to languages, accents, pro-
fessional roles, age, sex, race, social class and so on (Valian 2016). Through
schemas we respond automatically to what we take to be a successful pro-
fessional or a competent citizen. Being attuned to the prevailing
‘schemas’ means to be provided with habitual responses to certain stimuli,
that affect social interaction and social judgments (Haslanger, 2012: 415).
Deviations from the standard speech norms can trigger unfavorable
explicit and implicit biases towards speakers and writers perceived as non-
native, while favorable biases are displayed towards those with the ‘right’
accent, respectively. Biases can cause us to have feelings, attitudes and beha-
viors about other people based on characteristics such as race, ethnicity,
class, gender, age, appearance, language and accents. The bias is implicit
whenever a stereotype, either favorable or unfavorable, about a certain
group is automatically associated to members belonging to that group,
and affects one’s understanding, actions and decisions in a way that typically
takes place below our introspective radar (Blair 2002; Rudman 2004; Beattie
2013). Implicit bias can be expressed into actual outward behaviors despite
one being a genuine egalitarian (Nosek et al. 2007; Dasgupta 2013). Such
biases tend to be learned from the social structures in which we live and,
to some extent, track existing cultural stereotypes, ideologies, social
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tendencies, and existing patterns of privilege and disadvantage (Saul 2013;
Banaji and Greenwald 2013). These biases are different from explicit biases
that individuals acknowledge, but may prefer to conceal due to social desir-
ability purposes or to what they take to be prevailing political correctness
norms. Empirical research shows how implicit bias influences behavior in
a variety of subtle and troubling ways including, for example, CV selection
for jobs applications: the same CV tends to be more successful when it has
a typically white rather than a typically black name, or a typically male
rather than a typically female name, and so on (Dovidio and Gaertner
2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Krieger 1995; Steinpreis, Anders,
and Ritzke 1999). Studies of the so-called ‘shooter bias’ show how implicit
bias can influence visual recognition: the very same ambiguous object is
more likely to be visually recognized as a gun if held by a black man and
as something innocent (like a phone) if held by a white man (Unkelbach,
Forgas, and Denson 2008; Correll, Urland, and Ito 2006). There is evidence
that implicit biases affect the grading of student work (Bradley 1993); while
prestige bias has been detected in the evaluations of submissions to aca-
demic journals (Peters and Ceci 1982).1 Languages and accents, as we
said, are not exempt from the potential discriminatory effects of such
biases. The main difference in the case of languages and accents is that
stereotypes in this area often go unnoticed because they are not generally
perceived to be as problematic as racial, religious and gender prejudices,
despite the evidence on the impact of non-native accents on employment
opportunities, housing options, healthcare services and treatment in
courts (Deprez-Sims and Morris 2013; Gluszek and Dovidio 2010; Bestel-
meyer, Belin, and Ladd 2015). Even though people with non-native
1 Among social psychologists there is some controversy over the literature on implicit bias,
especially on the Implicit Association Test (IAT). On the degree to which IAT can be con-
sidered as a predictor of actual discriminatory behaviour see Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji
(2003); Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009); Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji
(2005); Lane, Kang, and Banaji (2007); Oswald et al. (2015). We do not explore this methodo-
logical debate here. However, IAT is just one amongst a number of implicit measures which
attempt to grasp individuals’ implicit associations and many studies such as those recalled in
the text do not rely on such test.
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accents tend to be considered as less competent, intelligent, loyal and of
lower status (Matsuda 1991), language-related discrimination has not
received the same degree of attention and has not been publicly declared
unacceptable in the same way as race and gender discrimination have.
The relative lack of public awareness of such a problem makes language-
related biases implicit in a different and special way, for they influence be-
havior without people noticing and without people understanding that
there is an issue of public concern there.
Stereotypes and prejudices in the case of being a non-native speaker and
writer of English may lead to the twofold effect of discriminating and affect-
ing people’s sense of self-worth. Typically, it is difficult to adjudicate whether
one is a victim of discrimination due to implicit bias. Although we know the
discriminatory implications of implicit bias at a statistical level, it is actually
hard to locate the behavior following the implicit bias in specific individual
behaviors outside the lab. One might obviously be aware of living in a society
whose social structures and prevailing standards and values nourish certain
automatic responses to how she speaks and to how she writes because, say,
her accent triggers further implicit stereotypes about her class or ethnicity.
But even though the discrimination from implicit bias is not always obvious,
the effect on the self-worth and self-esteem of targeted individuals is present.
Self-esteem is fundamentally an attitude which needs interpersonal support
from the social world, and which is dependent on the social standards.
Thus, although one may not be able to detect any particular instance of
discrimination which takes place, the feeling of potentially being the victim
of explicit or implicit bias can reduce one’s self-efficacy over time (Aronson
and Inzlicht 2004), and can cause self-doubt and have lowering effects on
aspiration and motivation (Steele and Aronson 1995), due to experiencing
structurally barred access to certain social goods (say, job positions in pres-
tigious universities). One’s self-esteem is in peril when one is subjected to
what Steele, Spencer and Aronson (2002) call ‘social identity threat’,
which has been defined as ‘the psychological state that occurs when
people are aware that they have the potential to be viewed negatively or
devalued because of their membership in a particular social group’
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(Townsend et al. 2011: 151)—in our case, because of their accent or
language improprieties. Even if and when the discrimination is covert
(not apparent), it may well have harmful effects on one’s self-esteem.
To sum up the argument so far: the creation of English as the global
lingua franca engenders issues for justice at different levels: (a) at the level
of the production of the public good of a common language, we have the
unfair share of the costs, exclusively borne by the non-native speakers of
English. Moreover, such unfair cost is not evenly distributed through non-
Anglophone societies, for it strikes more in certain professions and econ-
omic areas: academia is definitely one of such areas. (b) At the level of
opportunities for jobs and careers, non-native speakers are at a disadvantage
compared with native English speakers. (c) To the unequal opportunities
related to linguistic skills in the lingua franca, the effect of prejudices and
biases concerning an imperfect mastery of the language and a non-standard
accent must be added. They further reduce the opportunity of a non-native
speaker, for her accent and language imperfections may be taken as sign of
incompetence and less intelligence. (d) Like other form of biases, linguistic
and accent biases, leading to a credibility deficit, may impact on people’s
self-esteem, lowering the level of their aspirations and motivations to
pursue given paths.
3. Analytic Philosophy and Non-Native English Speakers
In the academic world, the establishment of English as a lingua franca for
scientific and scholarly communication is a fact. This process took place
first in scientific disciplines, but in the last few decades it has also accelerated
in the social and human sciences. In this respect, analytic philosophy is no
different from other humanities disciplines, for the student in analytic phil-
osophy, as well as in anthropology or literary criticism, must learn English if
she wants to pursue an academic career and be part of the global academic
community. That is, going to international conferences, publishing in pres-
tigious journals, getting research funding and commenting on colleagues’
works.
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Nevertheless, some specificity of this area may be pointed out. Analytic
philosophy is a tradition in philosophical thinking which mainly originated
in Great Britain; it was thus born as an Anglophone discipline from the start.
Its expansion outside English, American and Australian universities is rela-
tively recent. Hence non-native English speaking analytic philosophers are
still a minority, and the most prestigious journals and academic institutions
belong to the English-speaking part of the world (Schwitzgebel et al. 2018).
In this respect, a non-native English speaker practicing analytic philosophy
compared to one practicing continental philosophy has a specific disadvan-
tage, for her language imperfections are measured and valued against a
majority of native speakers. Moreover, as a rule, she was educated in insti-
tutions whose name is not linked to analytic philosophy. Thus we can
hypothesize that the predominant schema in this academic domain, con-
cerning both the language skills, the accent and the academic provenance
jointly concur to a more or less implicit attribution of a credibility deficit.
In other words, she may have to work harder to get the credits that other
colleagues are just presumed to possess as a default. In the domain of con-
tinental philosophy, instead, though the use of English has steadily
increased in the last decade or so, a non-native English speaking philoso-
pher may encounter the disadvantage of having to express himself in an
imperfectly mastered foreign language. But, in such an area (a) he is in
good company for the majority is still non-native; (b) he does not suffer
from the credibility deficit, for continental philosophy was in fact born
outside the English-speaking world and European universities enjoy a
good name for it. Hence, he may be assumed to be as competent as his
English speaking counterpart if not more, and to have something original
to say. Given these two conditions, editors of journals might be more under-
standing of his imperfect English prose, and more willing to help him out to
polish it; moreover, in any conference, even if English is now the lingua
franca, he will find himself as one among the many non-native and imperfect
speakers. Yet, the relative disadvantage of the non-native English speaking
analytic philosopher compared to her continental counterpart is partly
balanced by the fact that while for the former the language to learn is
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only English, the latter often must study other European languages,
German, French or Italian, depending on one’s research subject. The
lesser cost of having to learn only one language beside one’s own does
not probably even out the disadvantages of being a minority in a community
of native English speakers, where linguistic biases and related prestige biases
are spread.
In sum, the scholar of analytic philosophy, who is a non-native English
speaker, seems to face the same disadvantage as any other non-English
native scholars in academia insofar she has to become fluent in English.
Yet, the disadvantages of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers
are altogether probably stronger compared to their continental counter-
parts, because non-English speakers represent a minority in the analytic
philosophy community, which is not the case with continental philosophers,
and this situation makes their linguistic imperfections more conspicuous.
To this fact, we can add the prestige bias which is likely to be triggered by
their accent, contributing to make it harder to pursue an international
career in the analytic philosophy community than it does for their continen-
tal colleagues. Such disadvantages, however, can hardly be translated into
questions of distributive justice to be addressed in a political agenda. Not
all social disadvantages or asymmetries are a matter of distributive justice,
but only those affecting what John Rawls (1999) has called the basic struc-
ture of society, obstructing civil, political and basic social rights, and affect-
ing fair equality of opportunity. The basic structure of society is what Rawls
considers to be the legitimate scope of justice. Rawls (1999: 7) is not inter-
ested in ‘social practice generally’; in the allotment of advantage and disad-
vantage as such. People who are within the analytic philosophy academic
community, as in any other academic subjects, are usually above the
threshold of resources and educational opportunity, which constitute the
proper object of social justice. In fact, it is one thing is to talk about discrimi-
nation within a professional, prestigious area like any academic area, and
another thing to talk about discrimination concerning the capabilities of
functioning as a competent social agent and citizen. The reasonable assump-
tion here is that those who work in academia do not tend to be severely
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socially marginalized. Although they may well be at a relative disadvantage
compared to their native English speaking counterparts, they do not tend
to be at absolute disadvantage in terms of fundamental rights, social pro-
visions and fundamental capabilities. This means that being at a relative dis-
advantage compared to some others does not necessarily entail having been
wronged in a way that is relevant to justice and in a way that, thus, requires the
implementation of enforceable institutional remedial measures.2
So far we have considered the specific disadvantages of non-native
English speaking analytic philosophers concerning opportunities. There
may be another side of such disadvantages relative to identity, self-esteem
and status within the community. Being part of a minority group which is
marginalized and misrecognized has been proved to affect the individual
member’s self-esteem and to lower her expectations and aspirations so
that certain opportunities are not even considered. This reasoning has in
fact backed arguments in favor of forms of affirmative action or reverse dis-
crimination, in order to promote a reversal not only of lesser opportunity
but also of the lack of self-esteem and correspondingly of aspirations and
expectations induced by misrecognition.
Yet, as remarked above, the argument for remedial justice, in the form of
affirmative action, does not apply to the professional group of non-native
English speaking analytic philosophers, for, on the one hand, their discrimi-
nation is not relative to all social spheres, and on the other, they do not con-
stitute a minority with a record of past oppression and discrimination.
Moreover, the difficulties experienced in having their articles accepted by
top journals, or being successful in applications for fellowships and grants
may not have the negative impact on their self-esteem which we have
described above. In fact, the common knowledge of these difficulties in
the community provides the grounds helping the reduction of cognitive
2 Principles of justice can be both comparative and non-comparative. ‘Sufficiency’ principles
are those non-comparative principles which hold that ‘what justice requires is that each
person should have “enough”, on some dimension or other—for instance, have all of their
needs fulfilled, or have a specified set of capabilities that they are able to exercise’ (Miller 2017).
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dissonance between one’s expectations and negative outcome (Festinger
1957; Elster 1983). In a recent psychological experiment (Wentura and
Greve 2003), the findings unambiguously show that participants adapt
trait-definition for self-immunization purposes. Subjects who ex ante had
thought of themselves as specifically expert in history, and that had failed
the history test, processed the negative result by adapting the ‘criterial evi-
dence’ required to define someone ‘expert’ so as to escape the implication
of not being really expert. This experiment is discussed in the literature on
self-deception (Michael and Newen 2010) and corroborates an earlier
experiment showing that 94% of academic rated themselves above the
average compared to their peers (Gilovich 1991). Taking this discussion
into account, it seems that the circumstances of analytic philosophy for
non-native English speakers provide good grounds for preserving self-
esteem in the face of negative results, for the supposition of some sort of
bias against non-Anglophone scholars represents a ready-to-use rationaliz-
ation of one’s failure. Yet, the natural tendency to defend one’s self-
esteem in the face of contrary evidence (Brown and Dutton 1995) kicks in
only if the self-esteem has been developed in the first place.
This brings us back to the distinction between the disadvantage of being a
social minority target of prejudices and stereotypes in the social world, and the
relative disadvantage of being a minority in an academic group which is well
above the threshold for social inclusion. Yet, if in the case of non-native
English speaking analytic philosophers the disadvantage in terms of self-
esteem is ambivalent, since the possibility to readapt criterial evidence for
self-immunization is present, the obstacles created by unfavorable biases may
discourage young people to access this discipline. The assumption here
being that those who are not yet part of the academic community tend to be
more vulnerable, both in terms of access to basic social provisions and in
terms of the development of their self-esteem. This problem seems similar to
the lack of confidence that girls feel in the field of science such as math, and
which unduly influence their career choices. Moreover, considering the rela-
tive advantage of non-native English speaking continental philosophers over
non-native English speaking analytic philosophers, students may have a
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reason to stay away from amore difficult career track. If part of the twofold dis-
advantages of non-native English speaking analytic philosophers is grounded
in being aminority within a community dominated by native English speakers,
the effect of discouragement on prospective students may perversely contrib-
ute to reproduce the situation of disadvantage by keeping the non-native
English speakers a minority within the analytical philosophy group.
In sum, though the linguistic disadvantages suffered by non-native
English speaking analytical philosopher is basically similar to that experi-
enced by non-native English speakers in all areas of social interaction, yet,
some specific disadvantages can be detected with reference to this academic
field. They are due, respectively, to the relative small number of non-native
speakers among analytical philosophy and to the prestige bias accorded to
English speaking institutions. Even though this disadvantage may not necess-
arily translate into an issue for self-esteem for those who are already within
the community of analytic philosophers, such a situation may discourage
those who are not part of such community to undertake this kind of study
contributing in keeping the non-native group a minority.
Thus, the most problematic issue related to the potential exclusionary
implications of linguistic standards in analytic philosophy concerns those
who are not yet members of such epistemic community. Non-native
English speaking students may perceive the analytic tradition as a barren aca-
demic road and thus discount it as an available option in a way similar to how
young women may still negatively perceive the possibility of starting an aca-
demic journey in some male-dominated academic areas. In this case, the
most effective remedy has to do with the progressive widening and differen-
tiation of the community of analytic philosophers: the more diverse the com-
munity will get, the less gated it will seem. Such differentiation process has to
be left to the spontaneous mechanisms of social adjustment because reme-
dial institutional design measures such as quotas could hardly be justified
and implementable in the academic domain which is global in nature and
not subjected to any global institutional governance. Of course, some
minor measures can be put in place in terms of research policies at a
national or macro-regional (e.g., European) level which may help to
20 Francesco Chiesa and Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
reduce the gap between native and non-native speakers in the analytic phil-
osophy community. For example, the European Union may pay tribute to its
commitment to multilingualism by subsidizing part of the costs in language
proofreading services which are mostly borne by non-native speakers in
English-dominated European research areas. Acknowledging the role of
spontaneous mechanisms of social adjustment does not, however, imply
turning a blind eye to the problem. We believe in fact that these spontaneous
mechanisms of social adjustment which are hopefully leading to a progress-
ive widening and differentiation (e.g. more high quality analytic journals in
English led by non-native English speakers) of the community of analytic phi-
losophers can be either favored or stopped, depending on how the gate-
keepers (e.g. journals’ editors and those sitting on hiring committees) of
such community decide to pursue their role. Given that in this case linguistic
biases are implicit especially because unacknowledged and unnoticed, more
awareness of the problem can help to promote the right attitudes. Such call
for individual efforts to bring about the needed changes may sound in appar-
ent contradiction with the circumstance that some biases may be unaware: if
the bias is unaware, then individual efforts seem to be likely to be ineffective.
However, albeit such knowledge is often not easily accessible, it is arguable
that we have a ‘long-range’ indirect control on the kind of beliefs we have
so that, although we cannot simply decide to believe that P, we can expose
ourselves to the kind of contexts, communication and information that
might lead us to believe that P, for example by exposing ourselves to
counter-stereotypical examples or to members of stigmatized groups.
There is research suggesting that such indirect strategies may modify auto-
matic inhibitory systems in order to prevent the influence of internally
held biases on outward behaviors (Holroyd 2012: 284–286; Hieronymi
2008; Feldman 2008; Murdoch 1985: 32–35; Kang and Banaji: 2006). For
example, nowadays it has slowly dawned on people, at least in part, that
both genders should have representation in a conference panel, on an edi-
torial board, as well as in articles published by a journal on a yearly basis.
Thus, even if one automatically thinks of men as keynote, the now shared
belief that an all-male panel does not look good usually kicks in and leads
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to correct the automatic response. The same thing may and should happen
with reference to language and, to that end, the problem must first be
acknowledged by those who are making decisions in such areas. If, in daily
academic decisions, similar attention to that nowadays payed to gender
issues, is displayed with references to language, accent and provenance of
students and scholars, that will help to make the community of analytic phil-
osophy more enriched, diverse and inclusive.
To conclude, this paper has investigated whether analytic philosophers
who are non-native English speakers are subject to linguistic injustice and,
if yes, what kind of injustice that is and whether it is different from the
general disadvantage that non-native English speakers meet in a world
where English is rapidly becoming the lingua franca. We have argued that
the domain of analytic philosophy does not raise issues of linguistic rights
but of linguistic justice (in the sense specified in Section 1). We have then
claimed that we do not have reason to think that analytic philosophy is
different from other academic disciplines insofar as all scholars must
become fluent in the lingua franca to pursue an academic career. Yet
there are reasons to think that the domain of analytic philosophy may put
non-native speakers of English at a specific disadvantage compared with
their continental counterparts. We have argued that being at a relative dis-
advantage compared to others does not necessarily translate to a proper
injustice if fundamental civil, political and social provisions are in place—
as we can reasonably assume they are for those who work in academia. We
have then continued by arguing that a more straightforward circumstance
of injustice arises when such disadvantage affects those who are not yet
members of an academic community such as prospective students, thus con-
tributing to keeping the non-native group a minority. We have qualified this
latter case of disadvantage as a matter of structural injustice. Such injustice is
structural because it is not directly attributable to specific individuals but to
structural political, social, and ideological conditions. There is no simple
breach of perfect obligations but the disadvantage is rooted in more sys-
tematic (structural) reasons. This entails a forward-looking account of
responsibility held by those in positions of power. Such forward-looking
22 Francesco Chiesa and Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
accounts of responsibility should aim to change those social standards, social
norms and stereotypes which create and nourish discriminatory behaviors.
In this case, individuals in position of power have what Pablo Gilabert
(2017) has called ‘dynamic duties’ which are aimed at changing circum-
stances so that certain desirable outcomes become achievable by changing
political and cultural circumstances in turn.
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